Philosophy and Cognitive Science

Professor William Seeley, 169 Life Sciences & Philosophy

Office Hours: M/W 11:00 – 12:30 & by appointment

william.seeley@fandm.edu

              

Course Description:

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field in which theories and methods from psychology, computer science, neuroscience, linguistics, and philosophy are used to study cognitive phenomena, e.g. thinking, rationality, perception, language learning, and language comprehension. In its broadest form cognitive science is the study of how organisms acquire, represent, manipulate, and use information. In this context the goal of the cognitive science is to provide an account of the sorts of mental computations that underlie intelligent performance. Traditionally computational theories of mind have been central to this project. In this course we will evaluate the computational model of mind and discuss its application to three areas of cognitive research: vision, artificial intelligence, and language learning and comprehension. We will conclude by discussing several challenges to traditional cognitive science and evaluating the relationship between the computational model of mind and new research in cognitive neuroscience.

 

Course Goals:

The goals of this course are threefold: first, to introduce students to the computational theory of mind and evaluate the role philosophers play in the interdisciplinary study cognitive science; second, to introduce students to interdisciplinary research methods in cognitive science through the study of computational models of vision, artificial intelligence, and language comprehension; third, to evaluate philosophical issues concerning the nature of mind, consciousness, and rationality that emerge from empirical research in cognitive science.

 

Requirements:

 

Three 3 page (750-900 word) response papers (chosen from the assigned topics listed on the syllabus). The due dates of response papers will be determined by our progress through the syllabus. I will announce the dates in class as we move through the material, but in general they will be due one week after we wrap up discussion of the pertinent topic. Response paper cannot be late. If you miss the due date you forfeit the opportunity to write on that topic. (20%)

 

A 6 page (1800 word) mid-term paper on an assigned topic synthesizing the material covered in the first half of the semester. You will be given a choice between two paper topics. This paper will be due the day before the beginning of the mid-term break. (30%)

 

An 8 -10 page final paper on a topic of your choosing. All students must clear final paper topics with me one month before the last day of classes. The final paper is due at the first day of the exam period. (50%)

 

Class participation in the form of discussions of response paper topics is mandatory. As a result poor attendance will have an effect on your grade. (+/-10%)

 

                                                                                                                               

Texts:

 

Mindware, Andy Clark (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). (MI)

How Children Learn the Meanings of Words, Paul Bloom (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). (MW)

Mind Design II, ed. John Haugeland (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). (MD)

Connectionism, eds. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). (MM)

Electronic resources and pdf files on eDisk.

 


 

Schedule of Readings:

 

 

Topic 1: The Computational Theory of Mind                                                                                      

 

Clark: ÒAppendix 1: Dualism, Functionalism, Behaviorism, and BeyondÓ (MI)

Clark: ÒChapter 1: Meat MachinesÓ (MI)

Clark: ÒChapter 2: Symbol SystemsÓ (MI)

Marr: ÒThe Philosophy and the ApproachÓ (eDisk)

Block: "The Computer Model of Mind" (eDisk)

 

Response Topic 1:                       

Is the notion of multiple realizability introduced by the computational theory of mind plausible? (supplementary reading: Bechtel and Mundale (1999, "Multiple Realizability Revisited")

 

 

Topic 2: Artificial Intelligence: GOFAI and Connectionist Models                                                                                        

Newell & Simon: ÒComputer Science as Empirical Enquiry: Symbols & SearchÓ " (MD)

John Searle           : "Minds, Brains, and ProgramsÓ " (MD)

Copeland: ÒThe Chinese Room from a Logical Point of ViewÓ (eDisk)

Minsky: ÒWhy People Think Computers CanÕtÓ (eDisk)

 

Response Topic 2:                       

What exactly is Searle's Chinese Room Argument? Is it sound?

 

 

Clark: ÒChapter 4: ConnectionismÓ (MI)

Smolensky: ÒOn the Proper Treatment of ConnectionismÓ (MM)

Fodor & Pylyshyn: "Connectionism and Cognitive ArchitectureÓ (MM)

Ramsey, Stich and Garon:ÒConnectionism, Elimintivism, and the Future of Folk PsychologyÓ (MM)

Clark: ÒConnectionist MindsÓ (MM)

 

Response Topic 3:                       

TBA

 

 

Topic 3: Language and Memory                                                                                                        

                             

Bloom: How Children Learn the Meanings of Words (excerpts) (MW)

Bloom: ÒIntention, History, and Artifact ConceptsÓ (eDisk)

Tulving: ÒHow many Memory SystemsÓ (eDisk)

Medin, Ross, & Markman: ÒMemory Systems and KnowledgeÓ (eDisk)

 

Response Topic 4:                       

TBA

 

 

Topic 4: Perception                                                    .                                                                      

 

Clark: ÒChapter 5: Perception, Action, and the BrainÓ (MI)

Palmer: "Theoretical Approaches to VisionÓ (eDisk)

Marr & Nishihara: ÒVisual Information Processing: Artificial Intelligence & the Sensorium of SightÓ (eDisk)

Tarr & Bulthoff: ÒImage-Based Object Recognition in Man, Monkey, and MachineÓ (eDisk)

Dennis Proffitt: ÒEmbodied Perception and the Economy of ActionÓ (eDisk)

Kathleen Akins: "Of Sensory Systems and the Aboutness of Mental StatesÓ (eDisk)

 

Response Topic 5:           

Is Ômis-representationÕ a misnomer? Discuss and evaluate the possibility that what we have called in class Òconstructive misrepresentationÓ plays a productive role in action planning and cognition.

 

 

Topic 5: Minds, Images, and Cognitive Neuroscience                                                                                 

 

Kosslyn: ÒMental ImageryÓ (eDisk)

Anderson: "Arguments Concerning Representations for Mental ImageryÓ (eDisk)

Kosslyn: "If Neuroimaging is the Answer, What Is the Question?" (eDisk)

Pylyshyn: "Return of the mental image: Are there really pictures in the head?" (eDisk)

 

*Supplemantal: Kosslyn, ÒVisual Mental Images in the Brain: Overview of a TheoryÓ (eDisk)                                              

Response Topic 6:                       

Does cognitive neuroscience tip the balance in the imagery debate? What does your answer suggest about the role imaging studies can/cannot play in the study of cognition? Make sure to make use of the supplemental reading for this section

 

 

Topic 6: Emotions                                                                                                                              

 

Prinz: Gut Reactions (excerpts)

Phelps: ÒThe Interaction of Emotion and CognitionÓ

Atkinson & Adolphs: ÒVisual Emotion Perception: Mechanisms & ProcessesÓ (eDisk)

 

Response Topic 7:                       

TBA

 

 

Topic 7: Challenges to the Computational Theory of Mind                                                               

 

Brooks: "Intelligence without RepresentationÓ (MD)

van Gelder: ÒDynamics & CognitionÓ (MD)

Mike Anderson: ÒEmbodied Cognition: A Field GuideÓ (eDisk)

Rosalind Picard: ÒEnvisioning Affective ComputersÓ (eDisk)

 

Response Topic 8:                       

TBA

 

 

 

Some Miscellaneous Notes and Guidelines:

The reading list for this class is arranged in topics as opposed to individual sessions. You can find a detailed bibliography of the readings below. I will announce the particular readings for each class as we go along. This will allow us some flexibility in discussion so that we can spend more time on issues of interest to the class. I will occasionally upload supplementary materials to EDisk for students interested in pursuing particular issues beyond class discussion. I also reserve the right to make changes to the syllabus which reflect our class interests.

 

Response papers are designed to give students a chance to stretch their legs a bit with the material and give me a chance to assess your understanding of the material. These papers should offer a philosophical defense of your take on the issue at hand. But this does not mean that they are a free forum for opinions. Rather, your evaluation should be based on the logic grounding the arguments in the debate. Make sure that your papers set out the philosophical issues germane to the question and that your responses relative virtues and shortcomings of theoretical positions discussed in class.

 

Finally, moral behavior is the grounds for, and the framework of, a healthy society. In this regard it is each of our responsibility as an individual within the community of our classroom to act responsibly. This includes following the rules and guidelines set out by the College for academic behavior. Plagiarism is a serious matter. It goes without saying that each of you is expected to do his or her own work and to cite EVERY text that is used to prepare a paper for this class. In general philosophy papers are NOT research papers. Your response papers should not involve any outside research and you should be able to manage your final papers using only material from the syllabus, assigned supplemental readings, and class discussion. As a general rule, I ask that you not use the internet for your research except as assigned in class.


 

 

Bibliography:

 

Topic 1: The Computational Theory of Mind                                                              

 

Andy Clark, ÒAppendix 1: Some Backdrop: Dualism, Functionalism, Behaviorism, and Beyond,Ó Mindware, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 162 -170.

 

Andy Clark, ÒChapter 1: Meat Machines,Ó Mindware, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7-27.

 

Andy Clark, ÒChapter 2: Symbol Systems,Ó Mindware, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 28-42.

 

David Marr, ÒThe Philosophy and the Approach,Ó Vision ÒNew York: W. H. Freeman & Company, 1982), 8-40.

 

Ned Block, "The Computer Model of Mind," in Alan Goldman, Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 818-831



Topic 2: Artificial Intelligence: GOFAI and Connectionist Models                                        

 

Allen Newell & Herbert A. Simon, ÒComputer Science as Empirical Enquiry: Symbols & Search,Ó in ed. John Haugeland, Mind Design II, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 81-110.

 

John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," in ed. John Haugeland, Mind Design II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 183-204.

 

Jack Copeland, Jack Copeland, ÒThe Chinese Room from a Logical Point of View,Ó in eds. John Preston & Mark Bishop, Views into the Chinese Room (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 109-122.

 

Marvin Minsky, ÒWhy People Think that Computers CanÕt,Ó AI Magazine, 3(4), 1982, 3-15.

 

Andy Clark, ÒChapter 4: Connectionism,Ó Mindware, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 62-83.

 

Paul Smolensky, "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism," in eds. Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, Connectionism, Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 28-89.

 

Jerry Fodor & Zenon Pylyshyn, "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis," in ed. John Haugeland, Mind Design II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 309-350.

 

William Ramsey, Stephen Stich, & Joseph Garon, ÒConnectionism, Eliminitivism, and the Future of Folk Psychology,Ó in ed. John Haugeland, Mind Design II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 351-376.

 

Andy Clark, ÒConnectionist Minds,Ó in eds. Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, Connectionism, Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 339-356.

 

 

Topic 3: Language and Memory

 

Paul Bloom, ÒWord Learning and Theory of Mind,Ó How Children Learn the Meanings of Words (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 55-88.

 

Paul Bloom, ÒConcepts and Categories,Ó How Children Learn the Meanings of Words (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 145-170.

 

Paul Bloom, ÒNaming and Representation,Ó How Children Learn the Meanings of Words (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 171-190.

 

Paul Bloom, ÒIntention, History, and Artifact Concepts,Ó Cognition 60(1), 1996, 1-29.

 

Endel Tulving, ÒHow many Memory Systems,Ó American Psychologist, 40(4), 1985, 385-398.

 

Douglas Medin, Brian Ross, & Arthur Markman, ÒMemory Systems and Knowledge,Ó Cognitive Psychology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 4th edition, 2005), 174-207.

 

 

Topic 4: Perception                            .                                                                      

 

Andy Clark, ÒChapter 5: Perception, Action, and the Brain,Ó Mindware (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 84-102.

 

Stephen Palmer, "Theoretical Approaches to Vision," Vision Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 45 -93

 

David Marr & Keith Nishihara,ÒVisual Information Processing: Artificial Intelligence and the Sensorium of Sight,Ó Technology Review, 81, 1978, 2-23.

 

Michael Tarr & Henrich BŸlthoff, ÒImage-Based Object Recognition in Man, Monkey, and Machine,Ó Cognition, 67(1-2), 1-20.

 

Dennis Proffitt, ÒEmbodied Perception and the Economy of Action,Ó Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(2), 2006, 110-122.

 

Kathleen Akins, "Of Sensory Systems and the Aboutness of Mental States," Journal of Philosophy, 93 (7), 1996, 337-372.

 

 

Topic 5: Minds, Images, and Cognitive Neuroscience                                                         

 

Stephen Kosslyn, ÒMental Imagery,Ó in eds. Stephen Kosslyn and Daniel Osherhorn, Visual Cognition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 265-296.

 

John Anderson, "Arguments Concerning Representations for Mental Imagery," Psychological Review, 85(4), 1978, 249-277.

 

Stephen Kosslyn, "If Neuroimaging is the Answer, What Is the Question?" Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London B, 354, 1283-1294.

 

Zenon Pylyshyn, "Return of the mental image: Are there really pictures in the head?" Trends in Cognitive Science, 7(3), 2003, 113-118.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL: Stephen Kosslyn, William Thompson, & Giorgio Ganis, ÒVisual mental Images in the Brain,Ó Overview of a Theory,Ó The Case for Mental Imagery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 134-173.

 

 

Topic 6: Emotions

 

Jesse Prinz, Piecing Passions Apart,Ó Gut Reactions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1-21.

 

Jesse Prinz, ÒFeeling Without Thinking,Ó Gut Reactions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 22-52.

 

Elizabeth Phelps, ÒThe Interaction of Cognition and Emotion,Ó in eds. Lisa Barrett, Paula Niedenthal, & Piotr Winkielman, Emotions and Consciousness (New York: The Guilford Press, 2005), 21-50.

 

Anthony Atkinson & Ralph Adolphs, Visual Emotion Perception: Mechanisms and Processes,Ó in eds. Lisa Barrett, Paula Niedenthal, & Piotr Winkielman, Emotions and Consciousness (New York: The Guilford Press, 2005), 150-184.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL: Jesse Prinz, ÒEmbodied Appraisals,Ó Gut Reactions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 52-79.

 

 

Topic 7: Challenges to the Computational Theory of Mind                                        .          

 

Rodney Brooks, "Intelligence without Representation," in ed. John Haugeland, Mind Design II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 95-420.

 

Timothy van Gelder, ÒDynamics & Cognition,Ó in ed. John Haugeland, Mind Design II (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 1997), 421-450.

 

Mike Anderson, ÒEmbodied Cognition: A Field Guide,Ó Artificial Intelligence, 149, 2003, 91-130.

 

Rosalind Picard, ÒEnvisioning Affective Computing,Ó Affective Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 19-137.